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Congress phrased Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 18711 as
broadly as a remedial statute can be written; it declares that "every
person" who, acting under color of state law, deprives anyone of
a constitutional right, is liable in damages to the injured party. Yet
this apparently unambiguous statement of complete coverage has been
held to exclude liability of judicial officers. 2 This Note contends that
the congressional intent of Section 1983 and the policies underlying
this exemption do not support a grant of judicial immunity, but rather
argue for judicial liability under an actual malice standard.
1. This was the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
2. The term "judicial officers" is at least inclusive of: judges, Carpenter V. Dethmers,
253 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1958), justices of the peace, Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir,
1955), prosecuting attorneys, Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963), and other offlcerg
of the court, Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964).
In addition, common law immunity (and therefore § 19853 immunity) applies to "quasijudicial" officers ("those officers who are called upon to exercise judgment and discretion,
but not in courts . . ."). F. MEcHEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND
OFFiERs § 618 (1890). Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1968) (State Parole Board
Member); Erlich v. Glasner, 274 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (Kosher Food Law Repre-
sentative); Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (SEC Member); Lang v. Wood,
92 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Prison Warden); Phelps v. Dawson, 97 F.2d 339 (3rd Cir. 19371
(Fire Marshall). The term "judicial officers" will be used hereafter to refer to both judicial
and quasi judicial officers. The liability of judges is of primary concern since their im-
munity has the deepest historical roots and since judges represent the epitome of the
discretionary function for which the immunity is given. If judges are to be held liable
to § 1983 actions, the liability of other judicial officers should follow a fortiori. However,
some other judicial officers may have considerably more discretion than jud cs, at least
to the extent that judges may consider themselves bound by a set of precedents and a
hierarchy of courts.
3. "Actual malice" is used here analogously to its use in New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the term was defined in relation to a libel action as publication
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." Id. at 280. Applied to a judicial officer, this would mean that an action would be
malicious if it was done with actual knowledge that it was incorrect or with reckless
disregard of whether it was incorrect or not. An alternative would be to use the "will.
fulness" standard specified in 18 U.S.C. § 242, an analogous provision in the criminal
code. The word "willful" means "not merely a 'conscious purpose to do wrong' on the
part of an officer... but that there must be a specific intent to deprive him of a federal
right," Pullen v. U.S., 164 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1947). However, "malice" is a term much
more familiar to tort law, and it would seem anomalous to use specific intent, a doctrine
so closely associated with criminal law, in a tort context. Further, there seems to be no
good reason why a tort plaintiff should be required to show conduct amounting to a
criminal act in order to be indemnified. "Actual malice," despite the definition In
Sullivan, is by no means clearly defined. In practice, it may be simply an area on
the standards-of-liability continuum more stringent than simple negligence and less de-
manding than specific intent.
Some commentators have suggested that the "reckless disregard" standard of Sullivan
is so hard to meet that it is the equivalent of actual culpable knowledge. Note, The
Actual Malice Test and "Public Figures," 46 N.C.L. Rv. 392, 395 (1968); Note, New For
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In Pierson v. Ray4 the Supreme Court finally held the doctrine of
absolute judicial immunity applicable to actions under Section 1983.5
Pierson arose out of the 1961 arrest and conviction for breach of the
peace6 of nine clergymen engaged in a "freedom ride." After the
county court reversed their conviction, the clergymen brought suit
under Section 1983 against the police magistrate who had convicted
them.
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, determined that the
suit could not be maintained. The court found "no difficulty" in fol-
lowing the century-old rule of Bradley v. Fisher,7 holding judges abso-
lutely immune from common law tort actions for acts committed in
their judicial capacity. The Court's argument gained strength from
Tenney v. Brandhove,8 which held state legislators acting in their
official capacity immune from Section 1983 suits. "The immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well-established,"
the Court declared, "and we presume that Congress would have spe-
cifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine."
The doctrine of judicial immunity is indeed old, going back at
least to 1608,10 and is entirely judge-made." The common-law rule is
Times Co. v. Sullivan-The Scope of a Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 105, 117 (1965). However.
as Sullivan itself illustrates, the problem is often in finding a duty to investigate on the
part of the defendant. In dealing with judicial officers, the duty to investigate is always
present. Therefore, "reckless disregard" would probably acquire more meaning in actions
against judicial officers than in actions against publishers.
4. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
5. The Court had had many previous opportunities to rule on the issue, but had
denied certiorari. All of the cases in which certiorari was denied had found the judicial
officers immune from § 1983 liability. Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1964).
cert. denied 382 U.S. 858 (1965); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied
379 U.S. 915 (1964); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 867
(1964); Phillips v. Nash, 311 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 374 U.S. 809 (1963);
Saier v. State Bar of Michigan, 293 F.2d 756 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 868 U.S. 947 (1961);
Smith v. Dougherty, 286 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 903 (1961); Larsen v.
Gibson, 267 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 361 U.S. 848 (1959); Cuiksa v. City of Mans.
field, 250 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 937; Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d
288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kenney v. Killian, 352 U.S. 855 (1956); Eaton v.
Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 950 U.S. 915 (1955); Francis v. Crafts, 203
F.2d 809 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied 346 U.S. 835 (1953).
6. The Mississippi statute under which the clergymen were arrested was declared un-
constitutional in Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 US. 564 (1965). Thomas was decided after
the events complained of in Pierson.
7. 80 US. (13 Wall.) 35 (1872). The date of decision is sometimes given as 1871, ap-
parently because the decision was during the December, 1871, term of the Supreme Court.
It is dear, however, that the decision was handed down nearly a year after te pamage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. This means that the 1871 Congress could not have in-
corporated Bradley-the first Supreme Court case to find absolute judicial immuity-
into the Act. Nor can the 1871 Congress be faulted for not specifically overruling a doc-
trine which had not yet been accepted by the Supreme Court.
8. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
9. 386 U.S. at 554-55.
10. Floyd & Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23 (1608).
11. It has been suggested that "judges, as the ones administering tort liability, hase
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that "an action will not lie against a judge for a wrongful commitment,
or for an erroneous judgment, or for any other act made or done by
him in his judicial capacity."'12
Since judicial immunity is purely a common-law rule, it could pre-
sumably be overruled with impunity by legislation such as Section
1983.13 The first few courts that explored the question of whether
judicial immunity applied to actions under Section 1983 concluded
that it did not.14 Once the Supreme Court decided Tenney, however,
judicial immunity was read into the statute by analogy to the rule re-
garding state legislators.15 Though superficially appealing, this analogy
ignores at least three significant factors: (1) the wording of the statute
-judges act "under color" of law, but legislators usually "enact" law; 10
(2) the obvious parallel between state and federal legislators, the latter
constitutionally immune from suit for acts done in their legislative
capacity; 17 and (3) the disparate attitudes of the Radical Republican
congresses toward legislative and judicial power.' 8
at least had no reason for being unfriendly toward their own immunity." E. Jennings,
Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 272 (1937).
12. Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 656 (E. & A. 1882). Formerly, the rule did not
apply to judges of courts of limited jurisdiction acting outside their jurisdiction, even
innocently, because such a rule encouraged judges to keep within their jurisdiction.
T. CoorY, LAW OF ToRTs 491 (2d ed. 1888). All courts are now upon the same footing,
however, Case Note, 13 ARK. L. Rxv. 145, 146 (1959), and judges are protected If the
matter is colorably within their jurisdiction. 44 N.J.L. at 660.
13. The few arguments that judicial immunity is a constitutional requirement have
been singularly unconvincing. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 588-89 (3rd Cir. 1966)
(guarantee of a republican form of government); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 362
(1879) (dissenting opinion) (invading reserved powers of states). The Baucrs court ad-
mitted that the "guarantee of a republican form of government" clause was nonjusticia-
ble, but contended that it could be used as an aid in statutory interpretation. 361 F.2d at
589.
14. Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945) was the first case to
deal squarely with the issue, deciding that Congress did not intend to allow judicial
immunity as a defense to a § 1983 action. Picking was followed in McShane v. Moldovan,
172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949) and Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1916).
15. See, e.g., Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nom, Kenney
v. Killian, 352 U.S. 855 (1956).
16. Senator Trumbull made this distinction in the debate on an analogous provision,
§ 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. CoNr. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1758 (1866). Of course, legislators do much more than "enact" law, and an argument can
be made that when legislators go far beyond the legislative power (as was alleged In
Tenney) the immunity ought not to apply. The problem with this is that, accepting tllo
proposition that there ought to be some area of complete legislative immunity, ally dis.
tinction between what is immune and what is not must rest upon how far outside the
scope of the legislative power the particular legislator acts, not how maliciously le
acted, or how much damage he caused. This means that individuals, acting within an
ill-defined power may be absolutely immune, no matter how maliciously they act, but if
they unknowingly step outside that power for a moment, they will find themselves fully
liable. To put it simply, resting a question of liability upon whether a particular action
is or is not "legislative" seems ill-advised.
17. U.S. CONSr. Art. I, § 6. The Supreme Court, in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376 (1951), expressed serious constitutional doubts about holding state legislators
liable for actions within the scope of their duties, although no constitutional provision
was cited to support the court's misgivings.
18. The Court pointed out in Tenney that the Radical Congress was a "staunch ad.
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The wording of the statute would appear to be all-inclusive: Section
1983 in its present form applies to "every person," and the Act as
passed applied to "any person."' 9 The unrevised text of the Act also
declared that any person was liable "any.. . law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding."2  It is
certainly hard to imagine a broader definition.2'
The usual argument against this simple interpretation of the statu-
tory language is that since judicial immunity had been entrenched in
the common law for several centuries2 2 Congress would not have over-
ruled this venerable doctrine without saying so with specificity. It is
a standard maxim of interpretation that a statute should not be con-
strued in derogation of the common law without strong evidence that
the legislature intended that effect.23 However, the major premise of
the syllogism is defective: judicial immunity was not a universal doc-
trine.
The immunity began, of course, in England, and English decisions
have consistently held judges absolutely immune from liability for
their judicial acts.24 Yet even this broad immunity applied only to
judges of superior courts; justices of the peace, acting within their
authority, were liable to civil suit if they acted maliciously. -°
The English rule did not win immediate and widespread acceptance
in the United States. Since Bradley was not decided until April 1872
(a year after passage of the Civil Rights Act), a legislative inquiry
into the subject would have disclosed Randall v. Brigham2 as the lead-
vocate of legislative freedom." 341 U.S. at 376. The Radical Congress did not think so
highly of judicial autonomy, as evidenced by repeal of the right to appeal habeas corpus
cases to the Supreme Court. Ex Parte ArcCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869). See pp. 327-28 infra.
19. The change in wording was made, apparently for aesthetic purposes, by the re-
viser who prepared the Revised Statutes of 1878. Of course, he had no power to make
substantive changes.
20. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
21. Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945).
22. "It is to be found in the earliest judicial records, and it has been steadily main-
tained by an undisturbed current of decisions in the Englissh courts .... " Yates v
Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 (N.Y., Sup. Ct. of Judicature 1810).
23. See, e.g., American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950); Schar-
feld v. Richardson, 133 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
24. See, eg., Everett v. Griffiths, 2 A.C. 631 H.L. (1921); Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R.
5 Q.B. 94 (1869); Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220 (1868); Taafe v. Dones (1813), re-
ported in Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12 at 36n. (P.C. 1839); Floyd & Barker, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1608).
25. The Justices Protection Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44 (1848) so stated. A previous act,
43 Geo. 3 c. 141 (1803) had limited damages to twopence unless malice and lack of
reasonable and probable cause was proved. See Pease v. Chaytor, 3 B. & S. 620, 6-14 (K.B.
1863); Burley v. Bethune, 5 Taunt. 580 (C.P. 1814). A similar rule limiting the immunity
of inferior judges was formerly in effect in the United States. Sec note 12 supra. Under
the English rule, the defendant magistrates in Pierson, or in Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d
782 (8th Cir. 1955), for example, would not have been absolutely immune.
26. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
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iug Supreme Court case. There, the Court held that judges of courts
of general jurisdiction were not civilly liable for their judicial acts,
"unless, perhaps where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done
maliciously or corruptly." 27 The phrase "in excess of jurisdiction" ap-
parently does not mean that the judge did not have power over the
person or the subject matter, although what the phrase does mean is
unclear. Justice Field in Bradley overruled his dictum in Randall, and
explained the difference between acts "totally without jurisdiction"-
for which, even under Bradley, judicial officers could be held liable
-and acts "in excess of jurisdiction" for which, Bradley held, they
could not be held liable. Field's example of acting totally without
jurisdiction was a probate judge trying a criminal case, while an act
"in excess of jurisdiction" would be a judge improperly holding a
particular act to be a crime or sentencing a defendant to more than the
statutory maximum.28 Thus, a diligent congressman, looking to the
federal rule in 1871, would have had no reason not to surmise that
an incorrect ruling of law, maliciously made, which deprived an in.
dividual of his constitutional rights, would probably subject the of-
fending judge to liability. This would hardly indicate that Congress,
intending to subject judges to liability, would feel compelled to state
explicitly that judicial officers would come under the Act.
Nor would Congress have found a clearly defined doctrine of abso-
lute immunity in the prevailing law in the states. By 1871, thirteen
states had adopted the absolute immunity rule;20 six states had ruled
27. Id. at 536.
28. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352. A definition of "in excess of jurisdiction," though In a
different context, was given in McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 51 Pac. 696
(1897):
Any departure from those recognized and established requirements of law, how-
ever close the apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has
the effect to deprive one of a constitutional right, is as much an excess of jurisdlc.
don as where there exists an inceptive lack of power. Id. at 418.
See Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268, 279, 57, S. 860 (1912); Comment, Federal Comity,
Official Immunity and the Dilemma of Section 1983, 1967 Duxln L.J. '741, 752 n.54.
29. Alabama: Hamilton v. Williams, 26 Ala. 527 (1855). Arkansas: Borden v. State
to use of Robinson, 11 Ark. 519 (1851). California: Den v. Fernald, 1 Cal. Unrep. 70 (Sup,
Ct. 1859); Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1856). Connecticut: Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 Conn.
374 (1831); Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day's Cases 315 (1804); but see Ambler v. Church, 1 Root 211
(1790). Delaware: Bailey v. Wiggins, 1 Houst. 299 (1856). Massachusetts: Pratt v. Gardner,
56 Mass. 63 (1848). Missouri: Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 491 (1869); Lenox v. Grant, 8 Mo,
254 (1843); but see Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22 (1854). New Hampshire: Burnham v.
Stevens, 33 N.H. 247 (1856). New Jersey: Taylor v. Doremus, 16 N.J.L. 473 (1838); Little
v. Moore, 4 N.J.L. 74 (1818). New York: Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (Sup, Ct. of
Judicature 1810); but see Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395 (Senate 1812). North Carolina:
Furr v. Moss, 52 N.C. 525 (1860); Cunningham v. Dilliard, 20 N.C. 350 (1839); but see
Hardison v. Jordan, Cam. & Nor. 454 (1803). Virginia: Austin v. Richardson, 42 Va. 310
(1844). The Virginia legislature had enacted a statute making judges liable personally
in the appointment of guardians if they did so erroneously in a willful or culpably negli.
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that judges were liable if they acted maliciously;30 in nine states, courts
had faced the issue but had not ruled clearly one way or the other;31
and nine states had apparently not yet faced the issue.32 Here again,
there was not the solid unanimity which would compel a legislature
specifically to reject an acknowledged immunity.
The legislative debates on the proposed Act provide a third index
of congressional intent. Though the first section of the 1871 Act-now
Section 1983-did not receive a great deal of attention, all the avail-
able evidence points to the conclusion that Congress intended to cover
judges. The bill was introduced by Rep. Shellabarger, who stated that
the model for Section 1983 was the second section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 3 and "that section provides a criminal proceeding in iden-
tically the same case as this one provides a civil remedy for."34 The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 had been vetoed by President Johnson, par-
tially because it subjected state judges to criminal liabilityza In the
successful fight to overcome the veto, the chairman of the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee attacked the entire concept of judicial immunity
and stated that judges would indeed be liable under the bill. 30
gent manner. Id. at 323. Wisconsin: Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621 (1867); Keeler v.
Woodard, 4 Chand. 34 (1851).
30. Indiana: State ex rel. Conley v. Flinn, 3 BlackE 72 (1832); State ex rel. Robinson
v. Littlefield, 4 Blackf. 129 (1835). Iowa: WVasson v. Mitchell, 18 Iowa 153 (1044). Ken-
tucky: Revill v. Pettit, 60 Ky. 314 (1860); Gregory v. Brown, 4 Bibb 28 (1815). Maryland:
Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 479 (1862). South Carolina: State ex Yet. Tavel v. Jes-ey, 4
Strobh. 304 (1850); Macon v. Cook, 2 N. & McC. 168 (1819). Tennessee: Cope v. Ramsey,
49 Tenn. 197 (1870); Hoggatt v. Bigley, 25 Tenn. 236 (1845).
31. Georgia: Warthen v. May, 1 Ga. 602 (1846); Upshaw v. Oliver, Dudley's Rep. 241
(Elbert Super. Ct. 1832). The issue was further douded by Gault v. Wallis, 53 Ga. 675
(1875). Illinois: Lancaster v. Lane, 19 IlL. 242 (1857); Flack v. Alkeny, 1 IlL 187 (1826).
Kansas: Clark v. Spicer, 6 Kan. 440 (1870). Louisiana: Lilienthal v. Campbell, 22 La. Ann.
600 (1870). Maine: Downing v. Herrick, 47 Me. 462 (1859). Michigan: Gordon v. Farrar,
2 Doug. 411 (1847). Nebraska: Morgan v. Larsh, 1 Neb. 361 (1871). Pennsyltania: Kennedy
v. Barnett, 64 Pa. 141 (1870). Vermont: Davis v. Strong, 31 Vt. 332 (1858); Fuller v. Gould,
20 Vt. 643 (1848).
32. Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, West
Virginia.
33. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The provision, amended several times, is now 18 US.C. § 242.
34. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (App.) (1871).
35. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1680 (1866) (President's Message to Congress).
36. "[The doctrine of immunity] places officials above the law. It is the very doctrine
out of which the rebellion was hatched." CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866)
(remarks of Senator Trumbull). There are similar statements by other members of
Congress:
Any judge... who is called upon to decide whether ie State law is in force because
this law is unconstitutional, shall it to be in force notwithstanding this law, is to be
punished. Id. 1778 (remarks of Senator Johnson).
Representative Lawrence also stated that judges would be liable under the 1866 Act:
I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of the States than permit it to
invade, strike down, and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial pover per-
verted to such uses should be speedily invaded. .. .And if an officer shall inten-
tionally deprive a citizen of a right, knowing him to be entitled to it, then he is
guilty of a willful wrong which deserves punishment. Id. 1837.
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There is no indication that Congress had acquired any greater re-
spect for judicial prerogative by 1871. The Southern courts were "un-
der the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial
administration of law and equity.' 37 One representative saw courts in
the South as tools of rebel partisans:
[T]he decisions of the county judges, who are made little kings,
with almost despotic powers to carry out the demands of the
legislature which elected them-powers which, almost without ex-
ception, have been exercised against Republicans without regard
to law or justice, make up a catalogue of wrongs, outrageous viola-
tions, and evasions of the spirit of the new constitution, unscru-
pulous malignity and partisan hate never paralleled in the history
of parties in this country or any other.38
On three occasions during the debates, legislators explicitly stated that
judges would be liable under the Act.39 No one denied the statements. 40
In sum, the question of congressional intent seems relatively clear:
there was no universal acceptance of the broad English immunity rule
in 1871, and the only legislative history available supports the prop-
osition that Congress intended Section 1983 to cover judges. Still,
37. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Rainey).
38. Id. 186 (App.) (remarks of Rep. Platt). For similar statements, see id. 394 (remaikq
of Rep. Rainey); id. 429 (remarks of Representative Beatty); id. 153 (App.) (remarks of
Representative Garfield); rd. 277 (App.) (remarks of Rep. Porter); id, (remarks of Rep,
Lansing); id. 315 (remarks of Rep. Burchard); id. 505 (remarks of Senator Pratt); id. 179(App.) (remarks of Rep. Voorhees); id. 654 (remarks of Senator Osborne).
39. Senator Thurman stated:
What is to be the case of a judge? . . . Is that State judge to be taken fhom his
bench? Is he to be liable in an action? ... It is the language of the bill: for there
is no limitation whatsoever on the terms that are employed, and they are as com-
prehensive as can be used. Id. 217 (App.).
The remarks in the House of Representatives were even more emphatic. Representative
Lewis complained that
[b]y the first section, in certain cases, the judge of a State court, though acting under
oath of office, is made liable to a suit in the Federal Court and subject to damages
for his decision against a suitor, however honest and conscientious that decision may
be .... Id. 385.
And Representative Arthur declared:
Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge or court has
been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts .... Will iulness and corrup.
tion in error alone created a liability . . . .Under the provisions of thh scetlon
every judge in the State court. . . will enter upon and pursue the call of officlal duty
with the sword of Damocles suspended over him .... Id. 365-66.
40. The Third Circuit in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3rd Cir. 1966) dismissed two
of the statements in note 39, supra as "little more than opposition remarks," adding that
opponents' statements only have relevance where the proponents made no response to
them, 361 F.2d at 587-88, n.8. The court concluded that responses could not be expected
because of the times when they were made. Id. On at least one of these two occasions,
Representative Shellabarger, the floor manager of the bill, was present, and lie was not
loath to interrupt speakers who were misconstruing the bill. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 382 (1871). Further, it would seem odd that such a misapprehension would not
be corrected when a single sentence could have clarified the matter.
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the legislative history does not preclude entirely the Court's construc-
tion of the statute if the policy reasons for judicial immunity are suf-
ficiently persuasive.
In turning to those policy considerations, one finds in Pierson only
the following passage to justify judicial immunity:
It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that
are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse
the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be cor-
rected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied
litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or cor-
ruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not
to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.4'
The Court did not indicate which of these reasons it was relying on,
nor did it offer all the arguments for the immunity that the literature
reveals. Three separable reasons, however, may be discerned from the
opinion.
The first of these is that a judge's decision is appealable, and, there-
fore, the party need not sue the judicial officer to vindicate his rightsW2
But decisions of judicial officers are not necessarily appealable,43 and
appeal is not always a satisfactory remedy. The Court itself has rec-
ognized that a citizen's rights may be seriously violated even if he is
not ultimately convicted.44 An individual or group facing litigation
which is intended only to harass45 will take little comfort indeed from
41. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554.
42. See Jennings, note 11 supra at 272.
43. The appealability argument applies to most judges, but not to judicial officers
generally. For example, there are no procedures for appealing from the decisions of a
prosecuting attorney or a prison warden. Thus, no rationale for a broad judicial im-
munity may be based upon vindication upon appeal.
44. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). A plaintiff need not pursue his state
remedies before instituting a § 1983 action, Monroe v. Pape, 365 US. 167 (19061), which
would seem to recognize that appealability simply is not sufficient protection.
45. One of the injustices referred to in the Civil Rights Act debates was the use of
harassing litigation:
That plan is, by harassing litigations, unjust persecutions upon trivial and false
charges, to accomplish one of two things: first, to silence the tongue, overawe the
courage and utterly subdue all political opponents, or, failing in that, to make it
impossible for them longer to remain in the State ....
CONG. GLoaN, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 185 (App.) (remarks of Rep. Platt). By a series of haras-
sing measures, judges and public prosecutors (also protected by judicial immunit)) could
cause their opponents great inconvenience and discomfort, as well as heavy legal expenses.
The fact that such litigation is virtually certain to lose is irrelevant to one whose main
intent is to harass, not to convict, and the fact that his cause will ultimately be vindi-
cated is small comfort to a defendant who realizes that his opponent does not expect to
win. Heavy legal expenses could conceivably drive some organizations and people out of
quite legitimate if disfavored areas of activity, such as civil rights activities, and it is
possible that a criminal defendant, convicted by a malicious judge, would be unable to
raise an appeal bond. In some cases, injunctive relief from harassment may be available,
but it has seldom been used. Note, The Federal Injunction as a Reinedy for Unconslitu-
tional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
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his "right" to appeal. Whether or not the appeal vindicates the abused
party, the inconvenience and expense of litigation remains. Moreover,
if the judicial officer also serves as the "finder of fact," he may effec-
tively preclude successful appeal.
Another rationale offered by the Pierson court is that judicial officers
would be hounded by dissatisfied litigants if they were civilly liable.
Justice Field in Bradley pointed out that "[flew persons sufficiently
irritated to institute an action against a judge for his judicial acts
would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts which would be
essential to the maintenance of the action. '40 This plethora of lawsuits,
the argument runs, would cause a great inconvenience to judicial offi-
cers, a waste of their time47 and would be a strong deterrent to the
acceptance of judicial posts by prudent men. 4s This contention must
derive its merit from a belief that a judicial officer will have a great
deal of difficulty warding off suits which have no factual basis.
When courts first formulated the doctrine of judicial immunity, a
plaintiff who pleaded properly could force a judicial officer to go to
trial. This, of course, is no longer true in the federal courts: Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows courts to dispose of
the case on summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of fact.49
46. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (18 Wall.) 35, 848 (1872).
47. T. CooLEY, LAw OF ToRTs 475 (2d ed. 1888).
48. U.S. v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Cal., 1944); Taylor v. Doremug, 16 NJ.L,
473, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1838); Phelps v. Sill, I Day's Cases 315, 329 (Conn. 1804). A similar
argument was made for corporate directors charged with insider trading, Goodwln V.
Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 862-63, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933). but it was not convincing to
Congress, which, within a year, passed the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.CA. §§ 77a-77aa,
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78jj.
49. 6 MooRE's FEDRAL PRAcricE 56.04 (2d Ed. 1965). Summary judgment la been
said to be generally inappropriate when intent is relevant, or when relevant information
is peculiarly within the knowledge of the movant. Poller v. CBS, 368 US. 4641 (1962).
Others have contended that when there is an issue of credibility, the respondent should
not be denied the right of cross-examination. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1946). However, summary judgment has been granted in fale imprisonment litigation(which is what many § 1983 actions against judicial officers might be). Orvis v. BrIckman,
196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Lindsey v. Leavy, 149 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1945). There Is no
generally applicable rule for refusing summary judgment when intent and credibility are
relevant:
It is submitted that the correct principle is that a court should be cautious in grant-
ing a motion for summary judgment where state of mind is involved, or where the
facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the moving party and should be sure
that the party opposing the motion has had a fair opportunity to use the discovery
process to probe his opponent's mental state and to examine the facts his opponent
as at hand. But if, after such an opportunity, the opposing party cannot point to
anything tangible which will create a genuine issue of material fact, the motion
should be granted.
3 BARRON 8- HoLTzoF7, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1232.2.
Two recent cases are particularly relevant. In Washington Post Co. V. Keogh, 315 1?.2d
965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court gave summary judgment to a defendant charged with
"actual malice." See note 3 supra. In Bradford v. School Dist. No. 20, 364 F.2d 185 (4th
Clit. 1966) summary judgment was granted to a defendant school board In a § 1983 action
in which the board was charged with intentional discrimination.
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Moreover, the government to which the officer is responsible could be
expected to defend a suit against him,50 thus eliminating any great ex-
pense to him. It may also be that the type of person who would bring
a suit with no basis in fact would be just as likely to do so with a rule
of absolute immunity, since the plaintiff could state a good cause of
action by alleging that the judicial officer was acting entirely without
jurisdiction.5 1 In either event, the judicial officer would be put to some
inconvenience but a court could dispose of frivolous claims with dis-
patch. Most importantly, allowing considerations of public officers'
convenience to dictate immunity runs counter to fundamental public
policy:
The courts should be wary of any argument based on the fear
that subjecting government officers to the nuisance of litigation
and the uncertainties of its outcome may put an undue burden on
the conduct of public business. Such a burden is hardly one pecu-
liar to public officers... [b]ut the way to minimizing the burdens
of litigation does not generally lie through the abolition of a
right of redress for an admitted wrong52
The Pierson court also argued the much supported view that
judicial liability would detract from "principled and fearless decision-
making" and destroy the independence of judicial pfficers by intimida-
tion, but any argument that the pressure of liability would encourage
unprincipled-read "wrong," apparently-decisions must presume a
general weakness in judicial fibre. It does not logically follow that
principle automatically flees from a fear of law-suits0 4 Subjecting of-
50. See, e-g., CAL. GovT. CODE § 825. As a general rule, state governments will defend
against such actions.
51. In Spires v. Bottorf, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 379 U.S. 938 (1964)
the plaintiff was able to avoid judicial immunity, apparently on this ground. The de-
fendant judge had disqualified himself from hearing the plaintif's case, but had al-
legedly interfered constantly in further litigation. Determination of total ab~ence ofjurisdiction might be an easier cae for summary judgment because the main issue would
probably be the extent of the defendant officer's jurisdiction, a question of law. How-
ever, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action might allege spurious jurisdictional facts In his com-
plaint against the officer, which, if true, would have meant that the defendant vms acting
wholly without jurisdiction. In that case, both parties would be in the same situation
they would be in if the plaintiff baselessly alleged malice.
52. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 588.89 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan voted with the majority in Pierson, apparently not on this ground. Barr was a
defamation case in which the defendant pleaded privilege. The defense of official privilege
in defamation actions is generally considered to stand on the came theoretical footing
as the defense of immunity to tort actions generally. IV. PRossR, Tn LAw OF Tors 607
(2d ed. 1955).
53. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 US. (13 Wall.) 335, B47 (1872); Stewart v. Cooley, 23 Minn.
347, 350 (1877); Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 656 (E. & A. 1882); Little v. Moore.
4 N.J.L. 74 (E. & A. 1818); Yates v. Lansing. 5 Johns. 282, 298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. of Judica-
ture 1810); Taafe v. Downs (1813) reported in Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12, 6n.
(P.C. 1839).
54. "I cannot bring myself to believe that officers in command would hesitate to give
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ficers to Section 1983 liability is, of course, intended to be a control
on conduct, but the pressure should usually favor making as fair and
honest a decision as possible after reasonably diligent research.
Nevertheless, a judge may regularly find himself in situations
where only one of the parties before him is a potential plaintiff
for a Section 1983 civil suit. For example, in a criminal prosecution
such as Pierson, the state could not reasonably attack a judge's ruling
on the ground that it abridged the state's constitutional rights. Thus
the judge might be influenced by the possibility of civil liability to
decide any given case in favor of the party in a position to file an action
under Section 1983. Part of the answer to this admittedly meritorious
point is that constitutional rights are more important than other
considerations. More to the point, however, the fact that pressure on
the judicial officer encourages him to decide for the party with the
potential constitutional claim does not establish the necessity for com-
plete immunity. Rather, it supports only the requirement that the
plaintiff show something more than an honest judicial mistake, or
perhaps more than mere judicial negligence. If the terms "fearless
decision-making" and "judicial independence" mean that a judicial
officer should be free to reach any decision he wishes, for any motive
he wishes then Section 1983 liability will indeed undermine such "in-
dependence," and rightly so.
Quite apart from the Court's rationale in Pierson, courts and com-
mentators have presented other arguments for judicial immunity. The
Bradley Court opined that judges owe duty only to the government,
not to individual citizens. Concomitantly, a judge may be impeached,
but he cannot be held liable to a citizen for damages. By this reasoning,
absolute immunity should apply to all governmental officers, but even
Pierson acknowledged that it does not.5 Also, there is no inconsistency
between the judicial officer's duty to the government and a duty to
citizens not to deprive them of their constitutional rights. A citizen
can legitimately expect an officer, commissioned by the law, to act
only with due respect of individual rights; if he deliberately does not
respect those rights and causes injury, he is not acting within the
protection of his commission.r0 Finally, a remedy as seldom used57
orders which a sense of duty required ... from any idle apprehension of being harasscd
by vexatious actions." Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94, 108 (1869) (Cockburn, C.J.,
dissenting).
55. In Pierson, the court held that police officers are liable if they act maliciously and
without probable cause. 386 U.S. at 555 (1967).
56. Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342, 346 (1880).
57. A survey of forty states found that a total of only fifty.two impeachment pro.
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as impeachment is even more seldom adequate. Legislators may
well be unwilling to avenge a judicial harm to a particular individual
or class, and even where invoked, impeachment of the offending officer
affords the injured party no relief other than revenge. In short, the
impeachment argument assumes something to be true which, by the
very passage of the 1871 Act, Congress determined to be untrue: that
state governments are always willing and able to enforce individual
rights.
Others have contended that respect for the judiciary would diminish
and judicial dignity would suffer if judges were to be subject to liabil-
ity in civil actions based on their judicial acts.58 Respect for the ju-
diciary is desirable, but popular respect is hardly engendered by the
knowledge that, by reason of a judge-made rule, a judicial officer may
maliciously abuse his powers and leave the citizen without remedy.
Respect for the judiciary is only one aspect of respect for the law, and
if the two conflict, the latter should prevail. One might argue that
there are some types of judicial dignity it would be better to do with-
out.5 9
The strongest reason for judicial immunity may lie in the uncertain-
ties of the fact-finding process: suits might force a defendant judicial
officer to attempt an explanation of his mental processes in a particular
case.60 It is somewhat anomalous to place an official
in a position the very significance of which is to require his
opinion and accord it especial deference in the matter at hand,
and yet at the same time to penalize him with personal conse-
quences by reference to the opinion of another or others in regard
to the same matter.61
Certainly a judge's position in such a case would not be unique. Police
ceedings had ever been instituted, resulting in nineteen removals. Brand, The Discipline
of Judges, 46 ABAJ 1315 (1960). See F. Miller, Discipline of Judges, 50 Micu. L. Riv.
737 (1952).
58. See, e-g., Hamilton v. Williams, 26 Ala. 527, 533 (1855); Grove v. Van Duyn, 44
N.J.L. 654, 656 (E. & A. 1882); Floyd & Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23 (Star Chamber 1608);
T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 476 (2d ed. 1888).
59. See J. Frank, The Cult of the Robe, SATURDAY REv. OF LrnTrATuRE 12 (Oct. 13,
1945). The judicial dignity argument has, on occasion, been turned around with the
statement that making a plaintiff remediless against a malicious or corrupt judge would
undermine respect for the judiciary:
This conduct . . . would, if tolerated by law, bring the judicial department into
merited odium and contempt.
State ex rel. Conley v. Flinn, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 72, 74 (1837).
60. "The result is made to depend not upon his own original conviction ... but
upon the conclusions of other minds, under the influence of different considerations."
Pratt v. Gardner, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 63, 70 (1848). See Pierson v. Ray, 386 US. 547, 566
(1967) (Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting).
61. Jennings, note 11 supra at 273.
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officers, who must often exercise discretion in situations often far more
pressing than those judicial officers face, have only a qualified immun-
ity.02 Indeed, the argument is really addressed to difficulties of the fact-
finding process, not to unique characteristics of judges: nearly any
defendant may find himself in a similar position, but no other defen-
dant can claim complete immunity. If the previous arguments for
judicial immunity do not establish the soundness of the doctrine, this
argument makes little sense.
The foregoing rationales offered by the apologists for judicial im-
munity simply cannot support the doctrine. Replacing the immunity
with a system of some liability for judicial officers raises the trouble-
some question of defining the proper standard of liability. The present
standards for those officials who are subject to suit under Section 1983
are not entirely dear. Police officers, the most frequent defendants in
Section 1983 suits, are allowed the affirmative defense of good faith and
probable cause. 4 The chief difference between the affirmative defense
given to police officers and a malice standard is simply one of burden
of proof: a police officer, in order to escape liability, must plead and
prove that he acted in good faith, while a plaintiff would have the
burden of proving malice if actual malice were to be the standard of
liability for judicial officers.
The alternative to this subjective test is a standard of liability built
upon negligence. Though the arguments for immunity are hardly
persuasive, they do contain some valid points which support the view
that a negligence standard for judicial liability is unsatisfactory.
62. See note 55 supra. In regard to police discretion, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE rEroRT: TIlE POLICL
14 (1967); H. Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 ru'. AnaiN.
R:Ev. 140 (1967); Note, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime has been Com-
mitted-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 277 (1968).
Some courts have held police officer defendants to a negligence standard In § 1983
actions, at least in certain circumstances. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969):
Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968); Anderson v. Haas, 341 F.2d 497 (3rd CItr.
1965). Whirl harkened back to the common law and said that § 1983 cases that round II
the common law action of false imprisonment required only a negligence standard.
Joseph said that good faith was not available as a defense if the officer lacked both prob-
able cause and a warrant.
63. There is another argument sometimes made for judicial immunity, but full dis-
cussion of it is not required due to its essentially frivolous nature. It Is contended thatjudicial liability could make for unending litigation, with a dissatisfied litigant suing
Judge A at a trial presided over by Judge B, who is sued in a trial presidcd over by
Judge C, and so on. COOLEY ON TORTS 476-477 (2d ed. 1888). Obviously, summary judg-
ment is appropriate when a judge is faced with a compulsive litigant, and little judicial
time would be wasted.
64. The Pierson Court appeared to rely upon the general common law of torts In
deciding that this affirmative defense existed. 386 U.S. at 557. If the common law Is to
be the basis for determining what standards of liability apply, then the standard of
liability differs, depending upon what type of officer is involved.
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The inherent problems of the fact-finding process would be partic-
ularly acute if negligence were the standard of liability. Because a
defendant judicial officer is a "professional," his conduct would be
measured against the standards of competence in his profession. Ex-
perts would confront the finder of fact with a confusing array of testi-
mony almost certain to bog down a trial, particularly if the case is
tried to a jury. The action would be one essentially for judicial mal-
practice, with at least the same complexity and fogginess that charac-
terize analogous trials in the medical profession.05 The real possibilities
for "hounding" in this situation are obvious.
Nor could the hounds be driven off easily with a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Negligence cases are generally considered inappropri-
ate for summary judgment,66 and, in all probability, the affidavit of
one "expert" witness would be sufficient to raise an issue of fact for
trial.
The major function of a negligence standard would be to demand
judicial competence at the peril of civil liability.67 Not only are there
seemingly more effective ways of ensuring competence, but liability
for negligence might lend credibility to the assertion that inroads upon
judicial immunity would deter even competent persons from accept-
ing judicial roles, particularly underpaid, political appointments.
Moreover, and perhaps less speculatively, the recognized pressure 8 to
decide in favor of the party with a potential Section 1983 action may
be a significant factor when an admittedly incompetent judicial officer
is attempting to protect himself from his own incompetence. A certain
number of honest errors by judges is tolerable, and a negligence stan-
dard for Section 1983 liability might create more problems than it
could conceivably be intended to solve.
The serious drawbacks a negligence standard would present for the
judicial process demonstrate that it is unworkable, but an "actual
malice"69 standard has none of these disadvantages and comports well
with the Congressional intent of Section 1983.-0 The reasons for hold-
ing a judicial officer liable when he has deliberately or recklessly de-
65. For a discussion of the problems facing the finder-of-fact in medical malpractice
trial, see A. Cohn, Medical Malpractice Litigation: A Plague on Both Houss, 52 A.B.A.
JouRNAL 32, 32 (1966); 1- ,fyers, "The Battle of the Experts": A New Approach to an
Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 Nra. L. RE',. 539, 555-557 (1965).
66. 6 MOO'REs FEDERAL PRAcnacE 56.17. at 42 (2d ed. 1965). See Note, Use of Summary
Judgment by Types of Case, 36 MINN. L. REv. 515, 519 (1952).
67. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547. 566 (1967) (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas).
68. See p. 531 supra.
69. See note 3 supra.
70. See pp. 325-28 supra.
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prived an individual of a constitutional right are obvious; they go to
the heart of the concept of tort liability.
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for
any other personal motive not connected with the public good,
should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause.71
The problem is often presented as one of assumptions: postulating
a malicious defendant, it seems unjust to deny recovery; postulating an
"innocent" defendant, it appears wasteful to force him to face the
wrath of disappointed litigants. Plaintiffs whose grievances are real
ought to be compensated, and innocent judges ought to be protected
from liability and harassment. An actual malice standard for judicial
liability allows at least partial realization of the first goal, while fully
achieving the second.
The malicious deprivation of protected rights is, as Harper and
James point out, quite a different matter than understandable errors:
Where the charge is one of honest mistake, we exempt the officer
because we deem that an actual holding of liability would have
worse consequences than the possibility of an actual mistake
(which under the circumstances we are willing to condone). But it
is stretching the argument pretty far to say that the mere inquiry
into malice would have worse consequences than the possibility of
actual malice (which we would not, for a minute, condone). Since
the danger that official power will be abused is greatest where
motives are improper, the balance here may well swing the other
way.72
It is not a question of demanding competence when there is sonm
doubt that judicial officers can uniformly perform at that level, since
even the most incompetent officer can be diligent and fair-minded-
qualities certainly to be encouraged in public officials at every level.
Moreover, the malice standard places no strain on the independence
of the conscientious judge who decides close cases against the party
arguing a deprivation of constitutional rights. The only pressure in-
volved is exerted against the free rein to prejudice and abuse of judicial
power.
The inquiry into malice would entail more simplified trial issues
than a negligence standard and would render "expert" testimony
largely irrelevant. The questions presented would be the factual issue
71. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
72. F. HARPER & F. JAM~s, THlE L.w oF TORTs 1645 (1956).
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of the judicial officer's motive and whether sufficient evidence appears
to substantiate that the deprivation of rights was malicious. Presum-
ably, the judicial officer would not be likely to state or depose that he
had acted with malice; but the plaintiff attempting to demonstrate
reckless disregard or actual malice from the surrounding circumstances
and the judicial officer's statements would bear a heavy burden of
proof. 3 Moreover, the summary judgment procedure is proper and
likely to be determinative when pretrial discovery and affidavits dis-
close no evidence of abuse.
Generally, a government cannot be sued for the malicious torts of
its employees;74 but if judicial officers were liable under Section 1983,
their governments might freely choose, or be forced, to assume liability.
This would not only provide an equitable method of compensation,
but governmental assumption of liability might encourage the resusd-
tation of moribund removal and impeachment procedures to provide
an indirect control on the conduct of malice-prone judicial officers.
But whatever the long term results of imposing liability, there is no
adequate rationale-in history or policy-for altogether exempting
judicial officers from liability under Section 1983. The hoary doctrine
of judicial immunity, however, has had remarkable durability; it is
likely that inroads upon the doctrine will be accomplished only by
legislative intervention in terms more specific than even the seemingly
unequivocal language of Section 1983.
73. The presence of malice would often depend upon the degree of d-cretion thejudicial officer had. A judge who consistently decides a particular type of case in a manner
which deprives individuals of their civil rights, despite repeated reversals, and, perhaps,
a definitive statement on the matter by the Supreme Court, would dearly be deemed
malicious. Members of a state parole board, whose only mandate may be a very unclear
statement from the legislature, would be less likely to be found malicious because of the
very absence of standards in the field. However, even in this latter instance, circumstances
can be imagined where the member(s) of the board may quite properly be found to be
acting maliciously.
74. Eg., CAL. GoVr. CODE § 825.6. Cf. 38 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
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